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.
TRYING TO PUSH A SQUARE PEG THROUGH A ROUND HOLE: 
WHY THE HIGHER EDUCATION STYLE OF STRICT SCRUTINY 
REVIEW DOES NOT FIT WHEN COURTS CONSIDER K-12 
ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS 
]ames Nial Robinson II* 
Our doubts are traitors, and makes us lose the good we oft might 
win, by fearing to attempt. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With affirmative action programs at institutions of higher education 
seemingly lying on their collective deathbeds, 2 the Supreme Court, long 
silent on the issue of race-based admissions programs at the university 
leveV issued its rulings on the highly publicized University of Michigan 
cases.4 While representing a mixed bag, the rulings appear to breathe 
' Attorney with White & Case L.L.P. (Miami office). J.D., University of Florida Frederic G. Levin 
College of Law; B.S., Florida Gulf Coast University. I would like to thank Professor joseph S. jackson 
for introducing me to this subject. I would also like to thank my wife, LaTeshia, and our son, 
Christian Michael, whose combined patience and support made this article possible. The views 
reflected in this Article are those of the author only, and not of White & Case or its clients. 
I. William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, l.iv.78-80 (Brian Gibbons ed., Cambridge U. 
Press 1991 ). 
2. A recent decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, striking down as 
unconstitutional the admissions program employed by the University of Georgia, was typical of 
circuit court decisions wherein race-based admissions programs were discussed, dismantled, and 
then discarded. See e.g. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1254 (11th Cir. 
2001) (holding that the undergraduate admissions program at the University of Georgia that 
considered race was unconstitutional). 
3. The last case wherein the Supreme Court considered the use of race-based admissions 
programs at the collegiate level until the recent University of Michigan cases, see infra n. 4, was 
Regents of the U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) [hereinafter Bakke]. 
4. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003) (holding that the University of 
Michigan Law School's race-based admissions program was constitutional); see also Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2430 (2003) (holding that the University of Michigan's undergraduate 
admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause). Commenting on the importance of the 
two University of Michigan cases against the Bakke backdrop, Ted Shaw, associate counsel of the 
NAACP, offered the following: "These represent the most significant civil right cases the Supreme 
Court will have decided in the last quarter century .... This issue is nothing less than whether the 
doors of opportunity remain open for students of color." William Mears, CNN.com Law Center, 
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some new life into a program that some saw as having reached the end of 
its line, 5 with the Court specifically holding that diversity can be a 
compelling governmental interest.6 Thus, institutions of higher learning 
may consider the race of their applicants as the institutions seek to attract 
and enroll a racially diverse student body. 7 
The High Court's ruling will undoubtedly have wide-reaching effects 
on colleges and universities as they scramble to restructure evaluative 
processes that took years to create, assess, review, and revise. However, 
institutions of higher education are not the only places of learning that 
will be affected by the Supreme Court's decision. While a wide body of 
literature has addressed the use of race-based admissions programs in 
higher education,8 little attention has been paid to another set of 
admissions programs that the Court's decision will also affect: race-based 
admissions programs in K -12 public schools. Such programs primarily 
exist in the context of "non-traditional" schools such as magnet schools, 
charter schools and school transfer programs,Y wherein students typically 
compete for a limited number of seats. 
Cases challenging race-based admissions programs in K -12 schools 
are intriguing for several reasons. First, the use of such programs in 
school districts is on the rise, 10 making relevant law increasingly pertinent 
Affirmative Action Case Awaits Supreme Court Review, <http://www.cnn.com/2002/LA W /12/02/ 
scotus.affirmative.action/> (Oct. 31, 2003). 
5. For example, on Nov. 9, 1999, before any court in Florida ruled on the constitutionality of 
the matter, Governor )eb Bush officially ended affirmative action in Florida colleges and universities 
with his announcement of the "One Florida" initiative. The stated goal of this program is 
"increase[d] opportunity and diversity in the state's universities and in state contracting without 
using policies that discriminate or that pit one racial group against another." State of Florida, One 
Florida Initiative <http://www.oneflorida.org> (accessed Oct. 23, 2003). The plan seeks to 
accomplish this goal "without race-based admissions practices." State of Florida, <http://www. 
oneflorida.org/myflorida/government/governorinitiatives/one_florida/announcements.html>. 
6. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2329. 
7. !d. 
8. See e.g. Ross I. Booher, Student Author, Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause-Racial Preferences in College and University Admissions, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 
497 (1997); Jennifer C. Brooks, Student Author, The Demise of Aj)irmative Action and the Ej)ect on 
Higher Education Admissions: A Chilling fjfect or Much Ado about Nothing?, 48 Drake L. Rev. 567 
(2000); Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative Action Retrospective, 87 Gen. L.]. 981 
(1999); Leland Ware, Tales from the Crypt: Does Strict Scrutiny Sound the Death Knell for Affirmative 
Action in Higher Education?, 23 ).C. & U.L. 43 (1996). 
9. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 791 (1st Cir. 1998); Brewer v. W. Irondequoit C. 
Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 2000); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., !95 F.3d 698, 702 
(4th Cir. 1999); Hunterv. Regents of the U. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061,1062 (9th Cir. 1999). 
10. See e.g. Catherine Gewertz, Dayton Feels the Heat From Charter Schools, 21 Educ. Week I 
(Apr. 24, 2002) (available at <http://www.edwcck.org/ew/ew_printstory.cfm?slug=32dayton.h21> 
(accessed Oct. 23, 2003)) (documenting that the number of charter schools is on the rise, with nearly 
2,400 schools enrolling 580,000 students nationwide). The U.S. Department of Education reports 
that the number of magnet schools has tripled in the last decade. See Mid-Atlantic Equity 
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and pervasive. Second, there is a division among the Circuits as to how 
courts should rule on race-based admissions programs in the K-12 
setting. Some courts have applied strict scrutiny review when ruling on 
K-12 admissions programs in much the same manner that these courts 
review affirmative action programs in higher education. On the other 
hand, other courts distinguish between the K-12 and higher education 
programs and attempt to tailor their analysis accordingly. Third, an 
intriguing aspect not present in litigation over higher education 
admissions programs is that admissions standards that take race into 
account in the K-12 setting likely do so to further integration. This effort 
started some 30 years ago by order of the United States Supreme 
Court 11 -and is today meeting serious resistance across the country. 12 
The end result is a tension between Supreme Court precedent and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This article will first provide background cases that highlight how the 
consideration of race has been part of K -12 public school systems since 
the abolition of slavery. It will then outline four recent cases that deal 
with the consideration of race as part of admissions criteria in K-12 
public schools. Finally, in light of these recent decisions and the history 
of this body of law, this article will conclude that courts should employ a 
relaxed form of scrutiny when reviewing K-12 admissions programs that 
consider race as part of its assessment of candidates. Indeed, courts 
should give broad deference to school districts and allow them to 
consider race as they seek to reduce de facto segregation and racial 
isolation, and further promote integration. 
II. CONSIDERATION OF RACE HISTORICALLY 
A. The Reconstruction Era 
The "Reconstruction Era," which began soon after the abolition of 
slavery in the United States, heralded several legislative advances that 
secured the civil rights of African-Americans. 13 Chief among this 
legislation were the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution. 14 Of course, there was great debate 
Comortiurn, MAEC, Magnet Schools <http://www.maec.org/mag-schl.html> (accessed Oct. 23, 2003). 
11. Brown v. /3d. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), ajfd, 349 U.S. 291, 301 (1955) (holding 
that segregalion in public school systems was unconstitutional). 
12. See Glenn C. Loury, Integration Has Had Its Day, N.Y. Times Op-Ed (Apr. 23, 1997) 
(noting the courts' relaxing of earlier decrees mandating integration). 
13. juan 1'. Perea, Richard Delgado, Angela P. Harris & Stephanie M. Wildman, Race and 
Races: Cases and Resources j(Jr a Diverse America 131-32 (Jean Stefancic, ed., West 2000). 
14. /d. at 132-33. 
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about the scope of the new laws, and many resisted any real degree of 
equality between the black and white races. 15 The clamor soon reached 
the Supreme Court of the United States, which set forth the "proper" 
application of these Reconstruction Amendments. Unfortunately for 
African-Americans and other racial minorities, however, proper application 
usually meant limited application of these Amendments, particularly in 
cases involving violations of the civil rights of African Americans. 16 
B. Plessy v. Ferguson 
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court had occasion to hear 
arguments regarding the constitutionality of a statute that the legislature 
had passed in the state of Louisiana. 17 This statute provided the following: 
[A]ll railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this 
state, shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the white, 
and colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches for each 
passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so 
as to secure separate accommodations: provided, that this section shall 
not be construed to apply to street railroads. No person or persons shall 
be permitted to occupy seats in coaches, other than the ones assigned to 
them, on account of the race they belong to. 1x 
The facts that brought this case to trial involved Plessy, a man of 
mixed heritage, who was told to leave the white section of a train and 
move to the section designated for African Americans. 19 Plessy refused, 
was hauled off to jail, and was later convicted of violating this criminal 
statute.20 He subsequently challenged the statute on constitutional 
15. Id. at 140-41. 
16. See e.g. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 68-73, 80-81 (1872). The Supreme Court 
interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so narrowly as to 
render it completely ineffective in the protection of the civil rights of the freedmen. See Perea et al. 
supra n. 13, at 133. For constitutional purposes, this clause has been nullified and lies dormant. Td. 
Interestingly, the legislative history from the Fourteenth Amendment indicates that it was meant to 
be a very broad protection of natural law rights. See Con g. Globe, 39th Con g., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866), 
wherein Rep. Bingham argued that the Amendment should "protect by national law the privileges 
and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights of every person within the 
jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State." 
Id. It is obvious that the Amendment was meant to apply to a much broader category of cases than 
was decided by the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases. See also Pamela Brandwein, 
Reconstructing Reconstruction: The Supreme Court and the Production of Historical Truth ch. 4 (Duke 
U. Press 1999) (criticizing the Supreme Court for not giving a much broader meaning to the Civil 
War and the post-War amendments). 
17. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896), overruled, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483,494-95 (1954). 
18. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540 (emphasis added). 
19. ld. at 541-42. Plessy was ordered to vacate his seat in the white section by the Conductor. 
20. ld. Plessy was forcibly ejected from the train with the assistance of a police officer, and 
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grounds. 21 The Supreme Court of Louisiana eventually upheld the 
statute. 22 Plessy then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. 23 
What resulted was the ratification of the so-called "separate but 
equal" doctrine. 24 In its opinion, the Supreme Court stated that a proper 
review of the statute required an analysis of its reasonableness, 
determined by the traditions and customs of that area. 25 Thus, in 
essence, the Court upheld this legislation because it ratified the status quo 
of the time. The Court reasoned that while the Fourteenth Amendment 
gave equality of legal rights to African Americans, it did not guarantee 
them equality of social rights.26 This holding laid the foundation for the 
system of "separate but equal" public schools that quickly became the 
accepted legal norm in the United States.27 
The "separate but equal" doctrine provided additional support for 
school systems to continue the practice of racial segregation. For 
instance, the Court buttressed its argument for the "separate but equal" 
doctrine by citing to lower court cases that approved segregation in the 
schools. One of the cases relied on by the Plessy court involved 
segregation efforts in Boston public schools, which had been approved by 
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 2s In short, Plessy simply provided 
additional judicial support for school systems to continue this racially 
divisive practice. 
C. Brown v. Board of Education 
It was not until 58 years later that the Supreme Court struck down 
the "separate but equal" system of schools. In Brown v. Board of 
Education, African American minors challenged the judgment of the 
from there was imprisoned in the parish jail. 
21. Jd.at542. 
22. !d. at 540. 
23. Id. 
24. ld. at 552. 
25. Id. at 550-51. The court went on to state that "[i]n determining the question of 
reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions 
of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public 
peace and good order." Id. 
26. Id. at 551-52. 
27. See Perea et a!., supra n. 13, at 147. "The Plessy decision gave the Supreme Court's 
sanction to the separate-but-equal jim Crow laws of the late nineteenth century and probably fueled 
a dramatic expansion in the use of these laws during the early decades of the twentieth.'' !d. See also 
C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career offim Crow 54 (Oxford U. Press 1957). 
28. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-46. The case referred to was Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 
198, 206 (1849), wherein the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the general school 
committee of Boston had power to make provision for the instruction of colored children in separate 
schools established exclusively for them, and to prohibit their attendance in the other schools. 
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United States District Courts for the Districts of Kansas, South Carolina, 
Virginia and Delaware.29 Although the lower courts had held that 
segregation in public education had a detrimental effect upon African 
American children, it denied that the schools were substantially unequal 
with respect to buildings, transportation, and educational qualifications 
of teachers. 30 In so ruling, the lower courts relied on the "separate but 
equal doctrine" originally set forth by the Supreme Court in Plessy. 11 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the ruling of the 
lower court, overturned Plessy's "separate but equal" doctrine, and 
expressly held that segregation was a denial of equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 32 In so holding, the Court also noted that 
equality did not just apply to legal equality, as was announced in Plessy. 33 
Instead, the Court reasoned, the Fourteenth Amendment properly 
applied to civil and social equality as wel1. 34 
D. Brown's Progeny 
Brown made its way back to the Supreme Court a year later, at which 
time the Court instructed the School Board to make a "prompt and 
reasonable start" towards compliance with its prior ruling. 35 It was clear 
that the Supreme Court intended integration. The Supreme Court 
clarified and expanded Brown when ruling on the Swann cases of 1971. 36 
29. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486. Interestingly, Brown was not the tlrst case to explicitly reject the 
reasoning of Plessy. Mendez v. Westminister Sch. Dist. of Orange County, 64 F Supp. 544, 549 (S.D. Cal. 
1946), involved a statute mandating the segregation of Mexican-American students from English-
speaking pupils. In that case, the court reasoned that "a paramount requisite in the American system of 
public education is social equality. It must be open to all children by unified school association 
regardless of lineage." Id. An interesting footnote is that this case "led to the repeal of C:alil(m1ia's 
segregation statutes." See Perea eta!., supra n. 13, at 674. California Governor Earl Warren "signed the 
legislation repealing the segregation statutes." I d. Mr. Warren later served as Chief justice of the United 
States Supreme Court and wrote the majority opinion in Brown v. Board of Education. 
30. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486. 
31. I d. at 488. 
32. Id. at 494-95. The court stated that "[wjhatever may have been the extent of psychological 
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any 
language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected." Id. The Court went on to conclude 
that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly 
situated for whom the actions have been broug}lt are, by reason of the segregation complained of, 
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." !d. at 495. 
33. I d. at 492. 
34. See id. For a very detailed account of the long struggle for civil rights that ultimately led 
up to Brown, see Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and 
Black America's Struggle for Equality, (Alfred A. Knopf; Inc. 1975). 
35. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 349 U.S. 294,300 (1955). 
36. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1, 16 {1971); N.C. St. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43,43 (1971). 
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In the first of these cases, the Court stated that school authorities have 
"broad power to formulate and implement educational policy,"37 
including prescribing a specific percentage of minority students to attend 
each school "in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society." 38 
These statements provided powerful authority for permitting, or even 
requiring, school officials to consider race when assigning students to 
schools within their districts. 
Ill. A SURVEY OF RECENT CASES HIGHLIGHTING THE PROBLEM 
A. Standard of Review 
Four relatively recent cases involve the use of race-based admissions 
standards in the K -12 public school setting. 39 In each case, K -12 admis-
sions programs that considered race as a key criterion were challenged 
for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A strict scrutiny standard, established in Adarand Construction, Inc. 
v. Pena, was applied in each of the four cases.40 In Adarand, the Supreme 
Court held that all racial classifications instituted by governmental entities 
are subject to the strict scrutiny standard of review.41 This standard requires 
that the government demonstrate a compelling interest for employing a 
race-based classification.42 It also mandates that the program instituted by 
the government must be narrowly tailored to meet that interest.43 
B. Wessmann v. Gittens, 1st Circuit 
One of the recent cases dealing with admissions policies of K-12 
public schools was Wessmann v. Gittens, decided by the First Circuit in 
late 1998. Wessmann was a case involving "examination schools"-
magnet schools that filled half their seats through flexible racial/ethnic 
guidelines-which were operated by the City of Boston.44 In its review, 
37. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16. 
3H. ld. 
39. See Wcssmann, 160 F.3d at 792~93; Brewer, 212 1'.3d at 740; Tuttle, 19S F.3d at 700; 
Hunter. 190 F.3d at 1062. 
40. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, SIS U.S. 200,224 (1995) [hereinafter Adarand]. 
41. ld. 
42. !d. at 237 (emphasis added). 
43. I d. at 227 (emphasis added). 
44. "The City of Boston operates three renowned 'examination schools,' the most prestigious 
of which is Boston Latin School (BLS)." Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 791. In 1974, the City of Boston was 
fill!nd "to have violated the constitutional rights of African-American children by promoting and 
maintaining a dual public school system." I d. at 792. Although no specific evidence was produced to 
show discrimination, one of the classic symptoms of segregation was sufficient for the court: an 
exceptionally low number of African American students attended BLS. Id. The remedy offered by 
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the First Circuit concluded that the strict scrutiny standard applied. It 
began its analysis by subjecting the admissions program to the first prong 
of the strict scrutiny analysis: the compelling governmental interest test. 45 
The court then acknowledged that there was a split among courts as to 
whether a compelling government interest must be remedial in nature.46 
If so, there exists a contention that the attainment of diversity, arguably a 
non-remedial goal, is not a proper governmental objective. After some 
discussion on the matter, however, the court reserved ruling definitively 
on the matter and cautiously proceeded under the assumption that 
diversity could be a compelling governmental interest.47 
The court next turned to the question of whether the Boston 
program was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling governmental 
interest of racial diversity.48 However, soon after announcing the 
narrowly tailored means test, the court digressed to a discussion about 
whether or not diversity was a valid compelling governmental interest.49 
In the end, the court never did reach the question of whether the 
program was narrowly tailored. 50 
the court was to obligate BLS to ensure that at least 35% of each entering class be composed of 
African-American and Hispanic students. Id. By 1987, the examination schools were no longer 
under a federal court mandate to maintain the 35% set-aside. Jd. The set-aside program continued 
until 1995 when a disappointed applicant challenged its constitutionality, resulting in a court-
ordered injunction and the discontinuance of the program. Jd. at 792-93. As part of an effort to 
avoid a big drop in the number of minority entrants, a new policy was implemented. Jd. at 793. This 
policy filled half of the seats for each examination school based on academic performance, and filled 
the other half based on flexible racial/ethnic guidelines. Id. Sarah Wessmann was a student who was 
excluded from admission, and instituted a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the program. 
Jd. The district court held the program to be constitutional and an appeal quickly followed. Jd. at 
794. 
45. See id. at 794. While the Supreme Court had employed the strict scrutiny standard for 
some time, its majority opinion in Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224, very clearly stated that any racial 
classification imposed by the government would be subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny. !d. 
46. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 795. The first Circuit Court noted the opinion of the Fifth Circuit 
in Hopwood v. St. of Tex., 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), overruled, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 
(2003), but expressly declined to accept its reasoning; instead it decided to assume that Bakke was 
still good law and that racial diversity could be a compelling government interest based on the 
statement from justice Powell in that case. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 796. The Bakke case involved a 
race-based admissions policy at the University of California at Davis. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. In that 
case, justice Powell wrote that diversity could be a compelling governmental interest in an 
educational setting. Jd. at 311. The Hopwood case involved a race-based admissions program at the 
University of Texas wherein the court explicitly rejected Bakke as binding and stated that diversity 
could never be a compelling governmental interest because it was not remedial in nature. Hopwood, 
78 F.3d at 948. 
47. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 796. 
48. Jd. at 796. 
49. See id. at 796-800. The court concluded that "the School Committee's Policy does not 
meet the Bakke standard an<i, accordingly, that the concept of 'diversity' implemented by BLS does 
not justify a race-based classification." I d. at 800. 
50. Jd. 
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The Wessmann court's discussion of diversity as a compelling 
governmental interest is altogether confusing. While the court gave lip 
service to accepting diversity as a compelling governmental interest, it 
spent the next several pages of its opinion picking apart the school's 
program because it had diversity as its stated goal. 51 And, whereas the 
court stated that it would not rule on whether diversity could be a 
compelling governmental interest, it nevertheless proceeded to lay out 
arguments about why it is probably not a compelling governmental 
interest. 52 In the end, the court concluded that the school's program was 
unconstitutionaP3 The result caused very mixed signals. It was obvious 
the court was reluctant to embrace the diverse student body rationale as a 
correct principle of law. 54 
C. Tuttle v. Arlington County School Board, 4th Circuit 
In January 1999, the Fourth Circuit decided Tuttle v. Arlington 
County School Board. 55 In Tuttle, the court analyzed the Arlington 
County School Board's weighted admissions policy that considered race 
in its review of candidate files. 56 The specific question before the court 
was whether an oversubscribed public school could use a weighted 
lottery in admissions proceedings to promote racial and ethnic diversity 
in its student body. 57 Previously, the Fourth Circuit had upheld the 
remedial policy of the Arlington County School Board to achieve a 
51. Id. at 800-05. 
52. Id. at 796-800. 
53. !d. at 800. 
54. See Preston Green, May Examination Schools Use Racial Preferences in Their Admissions 
Process?: Wessmann v. Gittens, 135 Educ. L. Rep. 873, 889 (1999) (pointing out that educational 
institutions will have a difficult time meeting requirements established by the Supreme Court for 
showing that their admissions programs meet the compelling interest of eliminating the vestiges of 
past discrimination). 
55. 195 F. 3d at 702. 
56. Td. at 700. 
57. Id. As part of its normal operations, the School Board operated the Arlington Traditional 
School ("ATS"), whose stated goal was not the remedy of past discrimination, but rather to promote 
racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic diversity. Td. at 701. ATS was an alternative kindergarten whose 
claim was to teach students in a "traditional" format. Id. Admission was not based upon merit but 
rather solely upon availability. Td. Since demand always outweighed the number of available seats, a 
lottery system was introduced by which students would be selected. Td. "The probabilities associated 
with each applicant's lottery number were weighted so that applicants from under-represented 
[racial and ethnic] groups ... had an increased probability of selection.· Id. at 702. This program 
was challenged on constitutional grounds, with the allegation that it violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the fourteenth Amendment. Td. The district court ruled that the program was 
unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against the School Board. Id. at 700. The case 
was then appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. /d. 
60 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2004 
unitary school district. sH This time, the court would rule on whether 
classroom diversity was a legitimate policy. 
Because the program utilized racial classification, the court employed 
the strict scrutiny standard in its evaluation of the program.5~ In its review 
of the compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny test, the court noted a 
split of authority as to whether diversity serves a compelling governmental 
interest.60 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit went the same route as the First 
Circuit in Wessmann; it explicitly stated that "until the Supreme Court 
provides decisive guidance, we will assume, without so holding, that 
diversity may be a compelling government interest."61 
The court then moved to its analysis of whether the admissions 
program was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling government 
interest of racial diversity.62 In a very poorly reasoned section of its 
opinion/'3 the Fourth Circuit concluded that the program was not 
narrowly tailored and struck the admissions program down as 
unconstitutional.64 
As its rubric for analyzing the narrow tailoring issue, the Fourth 
Circuit employed five factors it had previously utilized in a vastly 
dissimilar case involving the promotion of non-minority police officers 
in North Carolina.65 The five "narrow tailoring" factors considered 
included: (1) the efficacy of alternative race-neutral policies; (2) the 
planned duration of the policy; (3) the relationship between the 
numerical goal and the percentage of minority group member in the 
relevant population or work force; ( 4) the flexibility of the policy; and (5) 
the burden of the policy on innocent third parties. 66 The court hurriedly 
went through each of the factors, summarily concluding that the 
program met none of them, and proceeded to strike down the admissions 
program as unconstitutional.67 
58. Hart v. County Sch. Bd. of Arlington County, Va., 459 F.2d 981,982 (4th C:ir. !972). 
59. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 703. "We review racial classifications under strict scrutiny." /d. 
60. Id. at 704. 
61. ld. at 705 (emphasis added). 
62. Id. 
63. A thorough discussion of the court's misapplication of its arbitrarily chosen factors in 
analyzing whether the program was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling governmental interest 
of diversity is discussed at length. 
64. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705-07. 
65. Id. at 706. The case from which the factors were borrowed was Hayes v. N. St. L 
Enforcement Officers Assn., 10 F.3d 207,216 (4th C:ir. 1993). 
66. See Tuttle, 195 f.3d at 706. 
67. /d. at 706-07. For a discussion on the impact Tuttle and similar decisions, see ( ;erard 
Toussaint Robinson, Can the Spirit of Brown Survive in the Era of School Choice? A /,ega! awl l'o/icy 
Perspective, 45 How. L.). 281, 318-20 (Winter 2002) (stating that these judicial decisions were 
deliberate legal attacks on Brown's call for racially integrated public schools). 
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D. Hunter v. Regents of the University of California, 9th Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit also heard a case involving the consideration of 
race in a K-12 public school setting. 68 This case involved an elementary 
school used as a research laboratory by UCLA's Graduate School of 
Education and Information Studies. 69 As was the case with its sister 
circuits, the Ninth Circuit conducted an analysis of the University 
Elementary School (UES) program using the strict scrutiny review 
standard.711 As if to avoid the question of whether diversity was a 
compelling interest, the court concluded that the Regents' "interest in 
operating a research-oriented elementary school [was] compelling."71 To 
preemptively quash any backlash against this conclusion, the majority 
listed some noteworthy caveats.72 First, the court noted that it was not 
UES's designation as a laboratory school that justified its admission 
process. 73 Second, UES's stated mission of educational research likewise 
did not justify its admissions process.74 Finally, although research was 
central to the UES's charter, the court did not believe its ruling would 
"lead to racial classification in 'every stratum of a state's public education 
system'. "75 
The court next turned to the second prong of the strict scrutiny 
standard and questioned whether the admissions program was narrowly 
tailored to serve the purpose of California's compelling governmental 
interest. 76 In finding that the program was narrowly tailored, the court 
pointed to the reasoning of the lower court as persuasive: "[i]t would not 
be possible, nor would it be reasonable, to require the defendants to 
b8. Hunter, 190 F.3d at 1062. 
69. /d. The University Elementary School (UES) had the stated research and training mission to 
help the State of California meet the needs of students in multicultural urban schools. Id. To this end, 
UES considered gender, race/ethnicity, and tamily income in its admissions process to obtain the 
desired student population. I d. One of the students who was not selected for admission brought suit, 
through her parents, against the Regents of the University of California under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Jd. at 1063. The suit challenged the constitutionality of the admissions program. Id. 
The district court concluded that the admissions program met the burden of strict scrutiny review, and 
ruled in favor of the Defendants. /d. The Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Jd. 
70. /d. at I 063. 
71. Jd. at 1064. 
72. Jd. at I 065. 
73. Jd. at 1066. See also jason Walbourn, Student Author, Strict in Theory, but Not Fatal in 
Fact: lluntcr v. Rexents of the University of California and the Case for Educational Research as a New 
Compelling State Interest, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 183, 200-02 (1998) (noting that a state's interest in 
educational research compares favorably with other interests that have been asserted in support of 
racial classitlcations). 
74. See Hunter, 190 F.3d at 1065. 
75. Jd. 
76. Jd. 
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attempt to obtain an ethnically diverse representative sample of students 
without the use of specific racial targets and classifications."77 The court 
went on to hold that judges who review the substance of a genuine 
academic decision (in this case, the manner of research), should show 
great respect for the faculty's professional judgment.n 
E. Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central School District, 2d Circuit 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard a case that involved a 
transfer program adopted by the West Irondequoit Central School 
District as part of a voluntary desegregation effort that started in 1965.7Y 
The court first addressed the issue of whether the reduction of racial 
isolation in participating schools was a compelling government interest.80 
The court pointed out that only the Fifth Circuit had ever ruled that the 
remedying of past wrongs by a governmental entity is the only 
compelling state interest to justify racial classifications,81 and 
acknowledged that there was significant disagreement among the circuit 
courts as to whether the Fifth Circuit view was consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent82 
However, the court rejected the Fifth Circuit's remedial argument for 
two reasons. First, the Fifth Circuit was the lone circuit to ever hold that 
a non-remedial state interest, such as diversity, may never justify race-
based programs in the educational context.83 Second, the Second Circuit 
itself had never barred diversity or other non-remedial interests from 
77. !d. at 1066. 
78. Id. 
79. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 741. One of the stated goals of the program was to reduce minority group 
isolation. Id. "In other words, the program is designed to reduce the percentage of minority students in 
predominantly minority city schools, and to increase the percentage of minority students in 
predominantly white suburban schools." !d. at 742 (quoting Brewer v. W. Irondequoit C. Sch. Dist., 32 
F. Supp. 2d 619, 621 (W.D.N.Y. 1999)). As the program was then being administered, only minority 
pupils were allowed to transfer from predominantly minority city schools to participating suburban 
schools, and only non-minority students were permitted to transfer from suburban schools to city 
schools. Id. at 743. A white student, through his parents, brought suit against the school district when 
he was denied the opportunity to transfer from his predominately minority city school to a suburban 
school. !d. The district court found the program to be unconstitutional and entered a mandatory 
injunction against the School District. Id. An appeal to the Second Circuit quickly followed. I d. 
80. I d. at 7 45. 
81. See id. at 747. The Fifth Circuit case referred to is Hopwood, discussed supra at n. 46, 
wherein the Fifth Circuit expressly held that diversity could not be a compelling governmental 
interest since it was not remedial in nature. 
82. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 747. The court stated that "notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit's 
holding in this regard, there is much disagreement among the circuit courts as to whether this is, in 
fact, the state of the law under current Supreme Court jurisprudence." !d. 
83. !d. at 747. 
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being compelling in the educational setting.84 In fact, there was binding 
precedent in the Second Circuit that explicitly stated that reducing de 
facto segregation serves a compelling government interest.85 To that end, 
the court concluded that a compelling government interest existed in 
programs that have as their objective the reduction of racial isolation 
stemming from de facto segregation.86 
The court next conducted a review of whether the court below had 
abused its discretion in determining that the program was not narrowly 
tailored to meet the goal of true diversity.87 The court quickly pointed 
out that since "true diversity" was not the stated goal of the program, the 
lower court would need to revisit its narrowly tailored analysis.88 The 
court did note, however, that so long as reduction of racial isolation is a 
constitutionally permissible goal, there is no more effective means of 
achieving that goal than to base decisions on race.89 The Second Circuit 
vacated the decision of the lower court and remanded the case to trial.90 
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS 
A. Fundamental Problems with Strict Scrutiny in K-12 Admissions 
To understand some of the inherent defects associated with the strict 
scrutiny standard, it is imperative to recall its birth. The Supreme Court 
first announced this standard in its review of the infamous Japanese 
internment that occurred during World War IU1 In that case, under 
conditions that have since been determined to be so deplorable that the 
United States Government issued an apology and paid reparations to 
those whom the government had detained,92 the Supreme Court held that 
84. I d. at 752. 
85. Id. The court stated that it was bound by prior precedent that "a compelling interest can 
be found in a program that has as its object the reduction of racial isolation and what appears to be 
de facto segregation." I d. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 752-53. 
89. Id. at 753. See also Faiz Ahmad, Student Author, Brewer v. West Irondequoit C. Sch. Dist., 
7 Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L.). 155 (Spring 2001) (concluding that when race coincides with 
a greater societal problem such as racial isolation, the consideration of race is appropriate). 
90. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 753. 
91. Sec Korematsu v. U.S, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1911) (stating that the Court was not prepared to 
say that the actions of the military were not justified). 
92. See Perea et al., supra n. 13, at 411-12. The authors note that "due to the activism of advocates 
for the interned japanese-American families, the survivors and descendants of persons interned during 
World War II ultimately received official letters of apology from the United States Government, signed by 
President George Bush, and payments of $20,000 per survivor in partial reparations." See also Yasuko I. 
Takezawa, Breaking the Silence: Redress and Japanese American Ethnicity, 51-59 (Cornell U. Press 1995). 
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the race-based classifications utilized in 1941 met the standard of strict 
scrutiny.93 And while this demonstrates that there is indeed some 
flexibility in the standard (which means that courts can safely apply the 
standard and find a program to meet its requirements without fear of 
being the first court to so decide), this has not been the path chosen by 
the courts that have heard most cases involving the strict scrutiny 
analysis. Indeed, many of the courts appear to utilize the '"strict' in 
theory and, fatal in fact" 94 theme of strict scrutiny to strike down 
programs they find offensive, without providing solid reasoning to back 
up their decision. 
As should be obvious from a review of the preceding K-12 public 
school cases, the courts must analyze two distinct areas when reviewing 
the issue of race-based admissions programs in K-12 public schools: (1) 
whether the program serves a compelling governmental interest; and (2) 
whether the program is narrowly tailored to meet that interest. These 
two areas are the prongs of the strict scrutiny standard announced by the 
Supreme Court in Adarand and followed by all courts that consider 
programs containing racial classifications and accompanying challenges 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
B. Is There a Compelling Governmental Interest? 
Two principal arguments support consideration of race in K-12 
public school admissions programs. The first argument is that racial 
diversity is a compelling governmental interest, and that those school 
districts that name diversity as the purpose of their various admissions 
programs therefore pass this prong of the test. 95 A second argument that 
supports consideration of race as a compelling governmental interest is 
that the government is trying to reduce de facto segregation and racial 
isolation in K-12 public school admissions programs that considers race. 
1. The Diversity Argument 
One of the interesting aspects of the diversity argument is that none 
of the circuit courts, except one, has ever explicitly rejected it.% In 
93. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223. 
94. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search a( Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 ( 1 972). 
95. See Anthony T. Kronman, Is Diversity a Value in American Higher Education'. 52 Ha. L. 
Rev. 861, 880-84 (2000) (arguing that admissions programs aimed at promoting racial and ethnic 
diversity in a student body are justified because they serve an internal educational good by 
promoting value diversity). 
96. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932. For a discussion detailing potential problems with this 
decision, See e.g. Philip T.K. Daniel & Kyle Edward Tim ken, The Uumors of My neath Have llecn 
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addition, none of the cases described above, when dealing with race-
based admissions in K -12 schools, specifically rejected diversity as a 
compelling governmental interest. 97 However, those cases that found the 
K-12 admissions plans unconstitutional did so because the courts were 
thoroughly convinced that the programs were not narrowly tailored.n 
Because they viewed the programs at issue as not satisfying the "narrowly 
tailored" prong of the analysis, these courts likely felt that they could 
dodge the issue of whether diversity serves a compelling governmental 
interest. Therefore, it is probably not enough to argue that because these 
cases have not ruled against the question in the K-12 context, the issue is 
resolved. 99 
The most obvious support for the notion that diversity is a 
compelling governmental interest is the express holding of the Supreme 
Court in Grutter v. Bollinger. 100 Among other things, this opinion 
attempted to clear away any confusion arising from the Court's 
splintered decision in U.S. v. Bakke from 25 years earlier regarding 
whether diversity is a compelling governmental interest in the 
educational context. 101 Writing for the majority in Grutter, Justice 
Exaggerated: Hopwood's Error In "Discarding" Bakke, 28 ).L. & Educ 391, 417 (1999) (concluding 
that the Fifth Circuit overstepped its authority by rejecting justice Powell's opinion in Bakke as the 
law of the land ); Emily V. Pastorius, Student Author, The Erosion of Af)irmative Action: The Fifth 
Cirwit Contradicts the Supreme Court on the Issue of Diversity, 27 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 459, 496 
( 1 997) (calling the Fifth Circuit decision a dramatic and unnecessary leap). Moreover, the recent 
decision of the Supreme Court in Grutter limits the utility of this decision, and likely serves to 
overrule its finding. 123 S. Ct. at 2337 ("we endorse justice Powell's view that student body diversity 
is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions"). 
97. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 796; Brewer, 212 F.3d at 752; Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705; Hwzter, 
190 F.3d at 1065. 
'!K. Sec Wessmamz, 160 F.3d at 800; Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705-08. 
99. See Victor G. Rosenblum, Surveying the Current Legal Landscape for Affirmative Action in 
Admissions, 27 ).C. & U.L. 709, 719-20 (Winter 2001) (noting the position taken by many courts that 
the issue of whether diversity serves a compelling governmental interest is open). 
100. c;ruller, 123 s. Ct. at 2325. 
101. justice Powell wrote that the "attainment of a diverse student body ... clearly is a 
constitutionally permissible goal." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. That case had no majority decision, 
with f(nlr justices voting to allow the use of racial preferences, and four other justices voting to strike 
down the quota system that the University of California was then employing. Jd. at 271-72. 
However, it was justice Powell's opinion, which in essence formed a majority on each of these issues, 
which was the conclusive and deciding factor. Id. at 272. See also Martin D. Carcieri, The Wages of 
Taking llakkc Serio11sly: Federal judicial Oversight of the Public University Admissions Process, BYU 
Educ. & L.). 161, 163-64 (2001) (arguing that courts have not been vigilant in applying justice 
Powell's opinion regarding diversity in higher education). Because justice Powell wrote alone, critics 
of the diversity argument long argued that his statement was not the opinion of the Court, and 
therefore was not binding upon later courts that visit the issue. See e.g. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948; 
Terry Carter, On A lioll(back): After Its Big Win in The Hopwood Case, Setting Aside Affirmative 
Action at the University of Texas Law School, The Center For Individual Rights Is On A Mission-To 
Do More of the Same at Other Public Universities, 84 ABA). 54 (Feb. 1998). 
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O'Connor stated that not only did the law school at issue have a 
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body, 102 but that, more 
generally, "student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can 
justify the use of race in university admissions." 103 
Grutter also provides a potent antidote to the traditional argument 
against diversity serving a compelling governmental interest, which states 
that only remedial interests qualify as compelling governmental 
interests. 104 Critics of race-based admissions programs have, to this 
point, relied primarily on Justice O'Conner's statement in Richmond v. 
f.A. Croson [hereinafter Croson] that consideration of race in a non-
remedial setting could lead to racial hostility. 105 However, there are 
several reasons why O'Conner's assertion has no binding precedential 
value. As a threshold matter, Justice O'Connor's statement about 
remedial interests was contained in a section of the case that only 
constituted a plurality of the Court106-it was purely dicta. Second, the 
court did not hold that only remedial interests could be compelling. 107 
Further, two subsequent cases, decided by the Seventh and the Ninth 
Circuit respectively, affirm that O'Conner's statement was not binding 
precedent. In each case, the court allowed for racial classifications in a 
non- remedial setting. 10H Finally, Justice O'Connor herself wrote in 
Waters v. Churchill, a post-Croson majority opinion, that the Supreme 
Court had "never set forth a general test to determine what constitutes a 
compelling state interest." 109 And, to make certain that she was not 
misunderstood, O'Conner curtly added in Grutter that "we [The 
Supreme Court] have never held that the only governmental use of race 
that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination." 110 
In short, there is now clear, unequivocal precedent for the 
proposition that diversity constitutes a compelling governmental 
interest. 111 However, there are natural limitations that accompany this 
102. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338-39. 
103. Id. at 2337. 
104. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945-46; Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. v. F. C. C., 141 !'.3d 344, 
354 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that diversity cannot be elevated to compelling level). 
I 05. City of Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 ( 1989). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996); Smith v. U. of Wash. Law Sc/1., 233 
F.3d 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 2000). In Wittmer, the 7th Circuit specifically noted that the language from 
Croson regarding remedial interests was purely dicta. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 919. It went on to hold that 
the use of racial classifications in promoting directors in boot camps for young criminals was a 
compelling governmental interest. I d. at 921. 
109. 551 U.S. 661,671 (1994). 
110. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339. 
Ill. I d. at 2337. 
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holding. First, this ruling relates to higher education, and courts opposed 
to using race as an admissions criterion may find this distinction 
persuasive when considering a race-based admissions program in the K-12 
context. Second, Grutter itself imposed severe restrictions on the narrowly 
tailored aspect of strict scrutiny review, such that even where race may be 
considered, numerous limiting factors exist. 112 Third, although Bakke 
appeared to provide fertile ground for the idea that diversity was a 
compelling state interest, even the courts that assumed so for the sake of 
argument routinely struck down programs based on their supposed 
failure to satisfy the narrowly tailored prong. 113 Thus, even with Su-
preme Court approval of diversity as a compelling government interest, 
there is little reason to believe that courts will significantly alter their 
approach in race-based admissions cases. Indeed, Grutter may prove to 
be of limited utility in an era where most courts appear antagonistic to 
any school program that seeks to achieve diversity. 
2. Reduction of De Facto Segregation 
The reduction of de facto segregation and racial isolation in K-12 
public schools is a second reason for these schools to consider the race of 
its applicants in their admissions programs. 114 One of the principal 
benefits of this argument is that it stays altogether away from the endless 
debate about whether diversity alone is a compelling governmental 
interest, that has gone on among judiciaries ever since Bakke. 115 An 
equally strong feature of this argument is that Brown and its progeny 
support it. 116 The Supreme Court plainly held in Brown that integration, 
indeed the elimination of the practice of segregation, was the goal that 
school districts should seek. 117 From this Supreme Court ruling which 
112. See id. at 2343-43, 2345-46 (Some limitations the Court enumerated were prohibiting the 
use of quota systems, requiring that race cannot be a determining factor, requiring that any 
preference not unduly harm or burden members of any racial group, and that any plan to prefer a 
race must be limited in time.). 
113. See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 791; Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 702. 
114. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 753 (concluding that the reduction of racial isolation stemming 
from de facto segregation was a compelling governmental interest). 
115. See, e.g., Steven M. Kirkelie, Higher Education Admissions and Diversity: The Continuing 
Vitality of Bakke v. Regents of the University of California and an Attempt to Reconcile Powell's and 
Brennan's Opinions, 38 Willamette L. Rev. 615, 635 (2002) (noting that cases dealing with the 
concept of diversity in higher education have been fragmented and have placed a cloud of suspicion 
over the continuing vitality of Bakke as controlling precedent). 
116. See N.C. St. Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 46; Swann, 402 U.S. at 16; Brown, 349 U.S. at 301; 
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
117. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495-96. While the Brown decision dealt with de jure segregation, 
courts have found the Brown decision to extend to cases of de facto segregation as well. See e.g. 
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of L.A., 551 P.2d 28, 30 (Cal. 1976), superseded, Crawford v. 
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disbanded the dual system of schools, comes the logical conclusion that 
reducing segregation is a compelling governmental interest. 
It may, therefore, be advisable for those who wish to defend race-
based admissions practices in K-12 public schools to couch their 
programs in terms of an "elimination of de facto segregation" rationale. 
This rationale was approved by the Supreme Court in Swann, 11 H and by 
the Second Circuit in Brewer. 11 Y It is likely that courts would accept this 
rationale in cases involving transfer programs, magnet and research 
schools since they fall under the K -12 public school umbrella wherein 
the precedents of Brown and Swann are binding. 
The premise of this approach-that de facto segregation is a growing 
problem in elementary and secondary schools in the United States-is 
supported by recent scholarly research.l211 For example, in July 2001, the 
Civil Rights Project at Harvard University released a study showing that 
segregation continued to intensify throughout the 1990s. !21 Indeed, 
researchers determined that much of the progress for minority students 
in K-12 public school equality was eliminated in the 1990's-a decade 
that included three Supreme Court decisions that drastically limited 
desegregation remedies. 122 These statistics regarding the resegregation of 
schools, together with an understanding of many courts' approach to 
diversity as a goal of the government in educational settings, serve to 
create a clear path that school district personnel should take when 
Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1285 (2002) (stating that school 
boards in California "bear a constitutional obligation to undertake reasonably feasible steps to 
alleviate such racial segregation in the public schools, regardless of the cause of such segregation"). 
118. In Grutter's majority opinion, justice O'Connor cited to numerous amici briefs that 
pointed to the educational benefits that flow from being exposed to persons of different 
backgrounds. 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40. She also made mention of the amici briefs filed by major 
American businesses that made clear that the skills needed in today' s global marketplace can only be 
developed by exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. ld. at 2340. Such 
practical benefits from the reduction of racial isolation provides further support for the use of race-
based admissions programs in K-12 schools, whose primary mission is to prepare students for "work 
and citizenship." ld. 
119. See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 747-52. 
120. See Gary Orfield & Nora Gordon, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University, Schools 
More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation, <http:www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/ 
research/deseg/separate_schoolsOI.php> (July 17, 20()] ). 
12!. Id. 
122. According to the study, 70.2% of the nation's black students now attend predominantly 
minority schools (i.e., minority enrollment of over 50%), which is up significantly from the low point 
of62.9o/o in 1980. Id. More than a third of the nation's black students attend schools with a minority 
enrollment of 90-100%. Id. The proportion of black students in such schools has been rising 
consistently since 1986, when it was at a low point of 32.5%. Id. White students remain the most 
segregated from other races in their schools. Id. Whites on average attend schools where more than 
80% of the students are white and less than 20% of the students are from all of the other racial and 
ethnic groups combined. Id. 
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constructing an admissions program for their non-traditional public 
schools. At the outset, it is essential that school district personnel give 
the program the proper label. Indeed, courts seem most hostile to 
programs that simply label their purpose as "racial diversity" 123 and 
significantly more welcoming to programs that list "reduction of de facto 
segregation" as their purported goal. 124 Therefore, the best approach for 
school district administrators to take may be to name "reduction of racial 
isolation stemming from de facto segregation" as the purpose of an 
admissions program that considers the race of its applicants, and to build 
the actual structure of the program around that purpose. By choosing 
this route, practitioners stay away from the oft contested "diversity" 
debate. This route also draws strength from the Supreme Court's 
holdings in Brown and Swann, thereby lending additional credence to the 
idea that desegregation is a compelling governmental interest. 125 
C. "Narrowly Tailored Means" Prong of the Strict Scrutiny Standard 
I. The Limited Utility of Rigid Factors 
The current application of the narrowly tailored means standard of 
the strict scrutiny analysis, at least in the context of K-12 public school 
admissions programs, is in need of a serious overhaul. As is readily 
apparent from the Tuttle case above, the actual standards utilized in a 
given court's narrowly tailored analysis are often arbitrary and rigid-
which are ironically two factors that courts find offensive in admissions 
programs that take race into account. 126 The factors utilized by the Tuttle 
court are similar in scope and substance to factors applied by other 
courts when applying the narrowly tailored means prong of the strict 
scrutiny standard; therefore, it is a worthwhile exercise to examine the 
factors in order to determine their efficacy and to ascertain their 
usefulness. 127 
123. Sec e.g. Wcssmann, 160 F.3d at 796-800; Hopwood, 78 F3d at 948. 
124. Brewer, 212 !:'.3d at 752. 
125. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495-96 (holding segregation to be a deprivation of equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment); Brown, 349 U.S. at 300 (ordering the School District to make a 
"prompt and reasonable start" in compliance with the earlier Brown decision); Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 
(staling that school authorities have broad power to formulate educational policy). 
126. Tuttle, 195 F. 3d at 705-07. 
127. The purp<"c of this exercise is to determine the utility of "factors" in determining whether 
or not a program is narrowly tailored. The Tuttle case was chosen because it is one of the main cases 
examined in this article, and it is the case that relied most heavily upon a given set of factors. Most 
courts examining this second prong of strict scrutiny employ these or similar factors; theref(He, 
much of the reasoning and analysis to follow will have broad application in cases similar to Tuttle. 
In other words, the flaws inherent in the Tuttle court's analysis will most likely be present, in a very 
general manner at least, in other courts' analysis of comparable factors. 
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The court in Tuttle borrowed and misapplied analytical factors from 
a 1987 plurality decision of the Supreme Court that dealt with the denial 
of promotions to African-American applicants working in the State of 
Alabama. 128 The most flagrant misapplication by the Tuttle court came 
with its analysis of the first factor: the efficacy of alternative race-neutral 
policies. The court stated that it was obvious that there were viable 
alternative race-neutral policies because the Study Committee that 
recommended the program had also proposed one or more race-neutral 
alternatives to promote racial diversity. 129 
However, the court's reasoning is flawed for at least two reasons. 
First, just because a program was proposed does not mean that it was a 
viable option. Second, the fact that the Committee ended up selecting 
the race-based program proves that its study of the situation resulted in a 
verdict that this was the best way to achieve the district's goals. However, 
this explanation was of no consequence to the Fourth Circuit, which 
seemed content to disregard this factor in one short, disinterested 
paragraph. 130 
The court's analysis of the third factor is equally perplexing. The 
court stated that although spots are not set aside for minority applicants, 
the same result is practically reached because of the odds being skewed. 131 
The court then mistakenly reasoned that: "The Policy's two goals, to 
provide students with the educational benefits of diversity and to help the 
School Board better serve the diverse groups of students in its district, do 
not require racial balancing."' 32 To wit: following the reasoning of the 
court, even if white applicants fill 68 of the 69 seats at the school, the 
goals of classroom diversity and service to students of diverse 
backgrounds is met. This conclusion does not square with common 
sense-how can the school district be expected to cater to the needs of 
diversity when it is not allowed to actually consider diversity in making 
classroom assignments? 
The court's reasoning elsewhere in the case is similarly unpersuasive, 
but does not appear as egregious as that which has been listed above. 133 
Nevertheless, the defects indicated above are sufficient to demonstrate 
that the Fourth Circuit chose a rigid and arbitrary method by which to 
evaluate the usefulness of a program that considers race. 134 Interestingly, 
128. U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987). 
129. Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706. 
130. See id. 
131. Id. at 707. 
132. Id. 
133. See id. at 705-07. 
134. See id. at 706 (The court itself noted that the factors would be difficult to assess.). 
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the Fourth Circuit dug its heels in deep on this issue, employing the same 
unsound reasoning it had used in Tuttle to strike down an analogous case 
in l999Y5 
2. A More Appropriate Application 
Comparable arguments for arbitrariness can be made against other 
cases as well, since it seems that each Circuit randomly plucks from its 
case law a set of factors that it deems helpful in striking down admissions 
programs. 136 However, simply pointing to the flaws of current narrow 
tailoring analysis does not solve the problem. Nevertheless, there is a 
solution, and its foundation is language employed by the Supreme Court 
in Adarand. In Adarand, the Court's majority explicitly stated that the 
strict scrutiny standard applies to all cases involving racial 
classifications. 137 The Supreme Court then provided critical insight into 
the purpose of the strict scrutiny standard: 
[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of 
race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important 
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures 
that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is 
little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was 
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.u~ 
In other words, the Supreme Court wants proof that there is a sound, 
legitimate reason for the government to make a race-conscious 
decision-the Court wants assurance that governmental agencies are not 
using race as a pretext for discrimination. In the K-12 context, school 
district personnel can point to the many benefits of a diverse class of 
students as proof that there is no hidden agenda when it comes to 
considering the race of applicants to non-traditional schools. 139 
135. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123, 130-35 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the school district's transfer plan, which considered the race of the applicants, did not 
pass constitutional muster). 
136. See e.g. johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1252 (lith C:ir. 2001) 
(latching on to the Supreme Court's obscure and unrelated "Paradise factors" in order to justify 
striking down an admissions program that took race into consideration). 
137. 515 U.S. at 226. 
138. I d. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493). 
139. The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University commissioned a study into whether 
diversity in elementary and secondary schools was of any benefit to the students. See Michal 
Kurlaender & john Yun, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University, The Impact of Racial and 
Ethnic Diversity on Educational Outcomes: Cambridge, MA School District, <http:www. 
civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/diversity/cambridge_diversity.php> (Jan. 29, 2002) ("Results 
from the survey suggest positive educational impacts of diversity for students in the district. Overall, 
a substantial majority of students report a strong level of comfort with members of other racial and 
ethnic groups." In addition, "students indicate that their school experiences have increased their 
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In a court's consideration of K-12 race-based admissions policies, a 
relaxing of the strict scrutiny standard is in order. This relaxation can 
come properly by the way that courts handle the question of whether a 
program is narrowly tailored. As is obvious from a review of the current 
cases on this issue, courts are sometimes quick to strike down a program 
because it does not satisfY some designated set of factors. 1' 11 The courts, in 
effect, are trying to shove square pegs through round holes-a futile effort 
indeed. The real question, consistent with Adarand, should be whether the 
government has a legitimate reason for considering race or whether the 
program is simply a pretext for discrimination. The answer to this 
question, in the context of admissions programs in K -12 public schools 
that consider race, based on educational jurisprudence in the United States 
for the past 50 years, must be that the programs are legitimate. 
Furthermore, the legitimate reason to consider race-altogether 
different from the arguments that raged wildly in the context of schools 
of higher education-is that the Supreme Court has ruled against 
segregation and has essentially advocated a plan of integration in the K-
12 public schools of this country. 141 If courts accept desegregation as a 
compelling governmental interest, it becomes clear that a school district 
will best meet this goal when it takes into account the race of the students 
when making assignment and admissions decisions. It does not matter 
the nature of the school program, whether it be for magnet schools, 
research schools, charter schools, or a transfer plan; so long as officials 
are seeking to institute programs which have as their goal the reduction 
of racial isolation that comes from segregation, the official should be 
permitted to consider race as part of their decision-making process. 142 
As noted previously, the Supreme Court is most concerned about 
illegitimate discrimination tactics disguised as legitimate admissions 
programs. 143 This danger is not present when a local school board acts to 
remedy clearly identifiable and obvious racial isolation in particular 
school districts. In these instances, programs seek to implement the very 
level of understanding of diverse points of view, and enhanced their desire to interact with people of 
different backgrounds in the future .... [S]tudcnts report they have been strongly affected by their 
school experiences."). 
140. See Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705-07. 
14 I. Brown, 349 U.S. at 300. 
142. Similar reasoning was actually employed by the Supreme Court in McDaniel v. Barresi, 
402 U.S. 39,41-42 (1971). A case that involved a school board that assigned students based on their 
race. In that case, the Court held that this program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and stated that if the board had considered something other than the race of 
the students it "would have severely hampered the board's ability to deal effectively with the task at 
hand." !d. at 41. 
143. Adarund, 515 U.S. at 224. 
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concept that the Supreme Court itself set forth almost 50 years ago. 144 
Therefore, courts should be less concerned with applying rigid factors 
and more concerned with determining whether a given program 145 is a 
good "fit" -and there is no better "fit" to achieve an integration of the 
races in the primary and secondary school level than a program that 
considers the race of the individual applicants. In addition, it is 
important to remember that the Supreme Court stated that school 
officials are to have broad power to formulate and implement 
educational policies. 146 Where school officials have put together 
programs that further desegregation, a long-standing and sound policy 
established by the Supreme Court, and which seek to reduce racial 
isolation in accordance with Supreme Court directive, the judiciary must 
grant deference to their judgment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The use of race-based admissions in K-12 admissions programs is at 
a critical stage. The circuit courts are divided on the constitutionality of 
these programs, and lower courts are just now beginning to digest the 
implications of the Supreme Court's recent University of Michigan 
decisions. This will undoubtedly influence the continued use of race-
based admissions at the K-12 level. The Supreme Court's judgment in 
that case, and its analysis and use of the strict scrutiny standard there, 
provide some guidance to courts at all levels as to the merits of race-
based admissions standards in the educational context. However, until 
the Supreme Court considers a K-12 race-based admissions program, 
lower courts are left with the charge to correctly balance the higher 
education cases with Brown and its progeny, all the while permitting 
school officials to continue their task of desegregating America's public 
schools. 
Lower courts will likely hear many cases regarding K-12 race-based 
admissions programs before the Supreme Court provides any clear 
directive on the matter. As such, judiciaries that grapple with this issue 
need to make a crucial determination as they review the various 
programs. These courts must determine at the outset of their analysis 
that the reduction of the racial isolation that results from de facto 
segregation is a worthy governmental goal. Based on the Supreme 
144. Brown, 349 U.S. at 294. 
145. This precise issue was described by the Supreme Court in Adarand and reiterated in 
Cruller: admissions programs "must be calibrated to fit" the distinct issues raised in the use of race in 
granting admissions in K-12 public schools. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341. 
146. Swanrt, 402 U.S. at Iii. 
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Court's directive concerning the end of racial segregation, and the recent 
research indicating that segregation is once again occurring within the 
public school system, there should be little doubt that the elimination of 
this practice is a compelling interest that the government has a legitimate 
right to address and remedy. Once a court concludes that the 
elimination of de facto segregation is a credible governmental goal, then 
the court must exercise great care in determining how school district 
personnel administer such a program. Moreover, careful consideration 
should necessarily result in upholding programs that are not illegitimate 
in their purpose; programs that seek to bring together those of different 
racial and ethnic backgrounds, in full compliance with the directive of 
the Supreme Court, should survive. If the courts do not permit these 
programs to survive, it will be only a short time before segregation makes 
an ugly, divisive, and permanent comeback in elementary and secondary 
schools. 147 
147. Perhaps we are already on our way back to segregation. Kevin Brown, The Implications of 
the Equal Protection Clause for the Mandatory Integration of Public School Students, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 
999 ( 1997). Professor Brown provides the following disturbing facts: 
On December 13, 1993, the Harvard Project on School Desegregation released the results of a 
study that shows that 66 percent of all Black students and 74.3 percent of all Hispanic students 
attended predominantly minority schools in 1991-92. for African-Americans, these figures 
represent the highest level of racial segregation since 1968. See William Celis, Ill, Study Finds Rising 
Concentration of Black and Hispanic Students, N.Y. Times AI (Dec. 14, 1993). In 1986, only 63 
percent of African-American students were attending predominately minority schools and in 1968, 
only 54 percent of Latino students were attending majority-minority schools. !d. at n. 5. 
Researchers at a recent conference in North Carolina gathered to address the issue of rescgregation 
in public schools. See Alan Richard, Researchers: School Segregation Rising in the South, 22 Educ. 
Week 5 (Sept. II, 2002) (available at <http:/ /www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug~02deseg. 
h22&keywnrds~Alan%20Richard> (accessed Oct. 27, 2003 )). 
